The absence of terrorist attacks should not be misconstrued as the end of terrorism. This was evident in Pahalgam this week, where a lull in militant activity may indicate that these groups are regrouping, rebuilding local networks, or establishing safe houses and arms caches. Conversely, an increase in violence and clashes does not necessarily suggest that terrorists are gaining the upper hand. Rather, it could indicate improved intelligence and operational readiness on the part of security forces, enabling them to intercept infiltrators at borders or flush out militants from their hideouts.
A swift response to the Pahalgam attack is necessary, and the suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty, along with other measures, has been the appropriate first step. Terrorism can only wither when its support systems – funding, arms, and recruitment – are dismantled or severely disrupted. To engage with Pakistan, however, should not be through negotiation, but rather through force.
Pakistan’s army chief, Asim Munir, recently made comments invoking “civilizational differences” between Hindus and Muslims. The public should not expect a shift in Pakistan’s stance as these remarks reflect a deeply ingrained, Islamist, and anti-Hindu ideological mindset.
With Pakistan’s economy in shambles and unrest simmering in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan’s military leaders are angling for a bailout. What better way to achieve this than to stir trouble, play the victim card, and hope that the US or China comes to the rescue with treats in hand?
Pakistan is unlikely to change course, given its deep-rooted embrace of a radical interpretation of Islam – one that considers even Shias, Bohras, and Ahmadis as heretical non-Muslims. In this worldview, being ruled by non-Muslims is unacceptable, making jihad not just permissible but obligatory.
While some West Asian countries are gradually distancing themselves from such rigid doctrines, Pakistan clings to them – largely because this ideology forms the core of its national identity and state narrative.
After the 1965 war, India’s forces captured the strategically vital Haji Pir pass in Pakistani-occupied Kashmir (POK). However, that hard-won advantage was relinquished at Tashkent. History shows that talks are often misread as a sign of Indian weakness under terrorist pressure. Worse, they offer Pakistan a chance to regroup, recalibrate, and deceive – once again.
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto arrived in Shimla in 1972, having instructed scientists to begin work on a nuclear bomb. In a moment of magnanimity, India gave away at the negotiating table what it had won on the battlefield – 93,000 PoWs and captured territory. It was a justifiable moment to press for a lasting resolution on Kashmir. However, the opportunity was squandered.
This cycle of magnanimous diplomacy continued, despite little justification. We rode to Islamabad even as Pakistanis, led by Pervez Musharraf, began their ascent up the heights of Kargil along the northern slopes. They were eventually pushed back. However, once again, at great cost.
There was magnanimity again by inviting Musharraf to Agra in July 2001. He scored a major psychological victory by holding a press conference. The talks failed, as they were bound to, because Musharraf arrived in Agra posing as the victor of Kargil, and demanding the moon.
The list of attacks by Pakistan-backed or Pakistani operatives is long and tragic, including the hijacking of IC-814 (1999), the Chittisinghpura massacre (2000), the Amarnath/Nunwan base camp massacre (2000), the Mumbai train bombings (2006), and 26/11 (2008). All these terrorist attacks, including the latest one in Pahalgam, have an internal dimension that hasn’t been fully addressed. There may have been security lapses at various levels – some unintentional, others deliberate. Clearly, there’s a mechanism that gathers, correlates, and transmits this information to terrorists.
While an investigation will undoubtedly follow, along with lessons learned and potential remedies, it’s important to remember that security forces can’t be omnipresent. We must all learn to be security-conscious and take precautions, making the task easier for those who protect us.
Talks, whether now or in the future, will inevitably be interpreted as a sign of Indian weakness under terrorist pressure. Moreover, they offer Pakistan an opportunity to regroup and deceive once again.
For any genuine progress, Pakistan must provide evidence of a change in both heart and intention. But the challenge lies in Pakistan’s military and civilian rulers cannot afford to demonstrate this change without risking their own survival. The country’s homegrown Islamic terrorism and its ideology are now deeply entrenched in the system. And as is the case everywhere else in the world, the voices of moderation are too quiet, too silenced to make a difference.
